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Abstract  
 
Based on a framework grounded in the institution-based view, this paper 
addresses the extent of global patent system integration and development. Our 
findings suggest that nations’ patent systems have yet ‘met’ the ‘international 
standards’, despite national and international endeavor toward this goal. The 
impact of international institutions on national institutions is reflected in the 
process rather than the outcome. Among the three components of patent 
systems across 88 nations, conformity is the strongest for ‘patent mechanism', 
operations is the most diverse for ‘patent administration’ and ‘patent 
enforcement’ does not form a cross-nation divide due to most nations being 
moderate enforcers.  
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Integration and Divergence of Patent Systems across National and 
International Institutions 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between institutions and international business (IB) has 
gained much attention in recent years. The focus of the relationship seems to 
center around institutional diversity across countries, its implications for 
multinationals, and their business (Delios & Henisz, 2003; Chao & Kumar, 
2009; a special issue was dedicated on this topic in the Journal of 
International Business Studies, volume 39, 2008). Several institutional topics 
associated with the patent system were also published in business journals. 
Examples include the role of patent system on foreign direct investment (Luo, 
2001; Khoury & Peng, 2011), culture impact on patent system understanding 
(Yang, 2005), patent impact on industries (Ghauri & Rao, 2009) and 
significance of patent protection for business (McGaughey, Liesch & Poulson, 
2000. We define the patent system as a nation’s system to legislate patent laws 
(stipulating national patent policy), administer patent filing and granting 
(patent offices’ functions) and enforce patent protection (judicial actions to 
resolve disputes and execute verdicts). National patent systems interact with, 
interrelate to and inter-depend on one another, harmonized by international 
patent organizations (i.e., World Intellectual Property Organization – WIPO 
and World Trade Organization – WTO).  In short, institution-IB linkages 
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indicate the need for international institutions and opportunities of cross-
national convergence under globalization.  
 International institutions, however, imply the complexity for IB that might 
lead to ineffective global strategy execution (Griffith, 2010). The complexity 
is interstate and inter-dependent: “The institutional environment is not a 
parameter but a rich constellation of interdependent structures and systems 
within a country, across dyadic pairs of countries and at the level of the 
international state system” (Eden, 2010, p. 175). The complexity is also 
associated with the relationship between national and international institutions 
where international organizations attempt to integrate nations with a set of 
standards for the purpose of efficient and effective multi-lateral business 
activities. International compliance of patent systems across countries is a 
typical example of such a complexity. Nations are required to meet the 
minimum standards set out by major international patent organizations as a 
trade-off to become a member and benefit from integrating with the rest of the 
world.    
   International institutions of patent systems are important for national 
institutions due to the indispensable links between patent systems and 
international business. First, the inabilities of countries to generate sufficient 
technologies for economic growth decide that a shortcut is international 
technology transfer through IB activities. However, nations’ desire to access 
foreign technology will not be realized if owners do not feel that their patent 
rights are protected (Bosworth & Yang, 2000). Second, exporting and 
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investing countries realize the importance of protecting their indigenous 
technology, they thus require policy guidance when considering transferring 
technology to unfamiliar countries (Bosworth & Yang, 2000). Third, external 
pressure from major developed countries has also intensified patent-IB links. 
A series of cross-border disputes have pressurized nations to negotiate and 
sign memoranda (Sherwood, 1997). Finally, patent system differences 
between developed and developing countries lead to intensive international 
intervention. As a result, the Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights Agreement (TRIPS) signed in 1995 among WTO members establishes 
a direct link between patent systems and trade, and to resolve dispute across 
countries.  
 Given the patents-IB links, research seems yet to catch up with the 
realities of fully understanding the convergence and divergence of patent 
systems across borders, particularly its association with international patent 
system. For example, it seems unclear as to what specific role the WTO and 
WIPO, as international institutions, have played in national institutions, and 
how patent systems, as a formal institution should be understood. 
Theoretically, awareness of these details enables extension and specification 
on institutional understanding. In practice, understanding of international 
inventive activities, research and development, and technological 
advancement help inform firms of the level of patent risks associated with IB 
activities, allowing them to take strategic measures to minimize them 
(Ostergard, 2000). Our research thus intends to contribute knowledge from 
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this perspective by addressing two questions: (1) Have nations integrated their 
patent systems under the influence of international institutions? (2) How are 
the three components of patent systems compared and contrasted in terms of 
development across the world?   
2. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
2.1. Conceptual Development 
We propose a comprehensive framework (Figure 1) to examine patent system 
development with three components: patent mechanism, administration and 
enforcement. ‘Patent mechanism’ means patent laws and regulations, and their 
legislature to safeguard ownership rights and public interests. ‘Patent 
administration’ is governmental functions to examining and granting patent 
rights, interpreting laws, supervising patent activities and resolve disputes 
without going through legal proceedings. ‘Patent enforcement’ refers to 
judicial systems for patent dispute settlement and execution (e.g., court 
proceedings and special courts to handle patent cases).   
< Figure 1> 
 The three components are interrelated to influence how the patent system 
works. First, the three components are inseparable to one another. Patent 
mechanism is a patent policy on paper that requires patent administration to 
function and monitor related patent activities, meanwhile, patent enforcement 
needs to be in place when disputes occur. Second, the relationship lies within 
the national institution where countries decide how a patent system should 
serve the state interest and its relationship with other nations. Finally, 
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international patent institutions influence national systems and coordinate 
cross-national patent activities.  
 While a patent system is nation-based, it does not isolate itself from 
international institutions for two reasons. First, the degree of influence 
depends on how a nation is integrated with the rest of the world. For example, 
if a nation becomes a member of the WTO, it has an obligation to comply with 
TRIPS.  A national patent system should reflect on international standards. 
Second, nations depend on one another. When they have strong trade ties, they 
desire compatible patent systems to ensure smooth bilateral business. 
However, how integrated or disintegrated of nations’ patent systems is unclear 
and requires further examination (Weismann, 2010).  
 Both scholars and practitioners recognize the indispensable nature of the 
three components for patent systems, but an integrated justification and 
examination has yet taken place. Academically, four major pieces of work 
have assessed global patent systems (elaborated when formulating 
hypotheses), but our paper appears to be the first to examine these three 
components systematically. In practice, nations emphasize patent mechanism 
as an important legal matter, and both patent mechanism and enforcement are 
explicitly stipulated in international treaties, conventions and agreements. As 
for patent administration, though little researched, it is important to address 
the efficiency of granting patent rights and handling patent disputes, and 
enhance public awareness of government policies (Sherwood, 1997).   
 Patent administration is also emphasized in patent system practice. 
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First, WIPO requires the establishment of satisfactory patent administration in 
national patent strategies (WIPO, 2005) to permit “coordination of policies 
relating to innovation and IP asset development … [such as] the coordination 
and/or consolidation of … [IP] offices”. Second, an effective patent 
administration demonstrates governments’ commitment to patent activities, 
including incentivizing innovation. Thus, a country’s patent administration 
also reflects government efficiency in granting patent rights (Sherwood, 
1997).  
2.2. Theoretical Foundations: Institution-based View 
Institutions - ‘rule of the game’ (structures & activities) - deal with humanly 
devised constraints for the purpose of guiding human interaction, maintaining 
stability and reducing uncertainty, and governing social behavior (Scott, 
2001). Informal institutions are imbedded within culture (e.g., norms) and 
formal institutions are associated with legal and regulatory activities (Peng, 
Wang & Jiang, 2008), which seem to create a larger hazard to multinationals 
(Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). Our study focuses on the latter form.  
 Institutions capture the complex and changing nature of environments and 
its relationship with organizations (Kiggundu, Jorgensen & Hafsi, 1983; 
Rugman & Verbeke, 1998). Institutional pressure steers strategic choice and 
therefore firm performance (Delios & Henisz, 2003; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau & 
Wright, 2000; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson & Peng, 2005). The interplay of 
institutions and organizations leads firms to adopt institution-based strategies 
to overcome constraints. As a result, institution-based view impacts on firm 
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decisions across borders from organizational founding and failure, 
organizational conformity, competitive advantage, partner selection to inter-
organizational relationship (Bjorkman, Fey & Park, 2007; Li & Filer, 2007; 
Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009). It should, therefore, be treated as a 
main and direct driver of firm behavior instead of background information 
(Peng, 2003). 
Institution-based view attaches a particular relevance to the rule of law 
(Roy & Oliver, 2009).  Weak rules of law increase the uncertainty of patent 
protection for owners and affect their legitimate returns (Delios & Henisz, 
2003), thus indicating its impact on business strategy decisions. The stronger 
the patent protection is in a country, the higher the scale of internationalization 
(Allred & Park, 2007; Chung & Beamish, 2005; Luo, 2001). When it comes to 
R&D partnership selection, firms opt for joint venture rather than contractual 
agreement to protect their ownership right (Hagedoorn, Cloodt & Kranenburg, 
2005) and adopt hierarchical governance when IP protection is weak (Oxley, 
1999).  
 Literature on institution-based view suggests the importance of the 
patent system – the national institution on strategic behaviors and businesses 
and its relationship with international institution. First, patent laws are 
important for IB due to their impact and complexity (e.g., a lack of 
international standards). Thus, the convergence of integrated patent systems 
appears to be an IB ambition to reduce transaction costs. Second, patent 
systems as a national institution are pressured to comply with ‘international 
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standards’ given the globalization trend. This is because internationally 
complied patent systems would aid cross-border business efficiency by 
reducing uncertainties, and help firms be less dependent on contractual 
surveillance (Walder, 1995; Gao, Murray, Kotabe, & Lu,  2010).  
2.3. Hypotheses: Integration and Divergence of Global Patent Systems  
2.3.1. Global Patent Integration  
International institution theory emphasizes universalism, that is, to allow 
nations to have a shared destiny (Ruggie, 1992). This shared destiny is driven 
by the need of national institutions for global harmonization. That is, 
international institutions are in demand so that certain arising interstate 
sensitive issues (i.e., security, diplomatic disputes, and intellectual property) 
are resolved and mutual benefits can be gained (i.e., trade, foreign direct 
investment). IP has been on the agenda of international institutions particularly 
in the past two decades due to nations’ intensified technology transfer 
(patents), cross-border business dealing (trademarks) and cultural exchanges 
(copyrights). Nations’ call for institutionalizing certain rules helps countries 
toward a broad integration thus, a direction for harmonization.   
   International institutions of patent systems are an integral part of and 
a great influence on nation-based institutions. These are a ‘philosophical or 
culture institution’ (Massel, 1973, p. 673) that set a minimum standard for 
nations to comply with toward integration across nations. Global patent 
integration considers how countries have conformed to international patent 
mechanisms by ratifying treaties, conventions and agreements (Ferrantino, 
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1993). It also looks at nations’ administrative efficiency in patent filing and 
granting (Sherwood, 1997). Moreover, it examines how nations resolve cross-
border patent disputes and settlement (Ostergard, 2000). While the 
interrelated, interacting and interdependent relationships among nations have 
increased the need for global integration, countries seem to operate 
independently within the broad international patent system due to their 
different institutional background.   
With efforts toward integration of international institutions, treaties, 
conventions and agreements are set for nations to comply. This includes the 
objectives and functioning of the three-component patent system in the 
international context. International treaties, conventions and agreements serve 
as ‘models’ to assist nations in drafting their IP laws. Of the 28 treaties, 
conventions and agreements, 25 are under the auspices of WIPO; among the 
others, TRIPS (under the WTO) aims to ‘fill the gaps’ in respect of judicial 
enforcement. 
International administration allows for a single application of a patent 
within all (or selected) members to be made to a designated WIPO Bureau 
from the applicant’s country. Thus, an owner can gain worldwide protection 
for a patent in all WIPO member states (the WTO has no administrative 
system to handle international filing).  
Enforcement represents the major difference between these two 
organizations. WIPO has limited enforcement power. If two countries have a 
patent dispute, a WIPO tribunal may arrange a settlement. However, if one 
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refuses to implement the verdict, the organization has no power of control. A 
WTO settlement, on the contrary, is enforceable. Thus, when a member 
refuses to implement the verdict, the WTO can instruct the complainant to 
take actions (e.g., embargos or trade sanctions) against the offender.  
 TRIPS integrates nations’ patent systems more extensively than other 
treaties, conventions and agreements, in four ways. First, it is the only 
agreement that directly links patents with trade (WTO, 1995) and production 
and services. Second, it is an agreement that balances stakeholder interests 
between rights holders’ and general public (WTO, 1995, Article 7). Third, 
TRIPS members are obliged to implement enforcement. Judicial execution is 
monitored by the WTO at national and international levels. Finally, TRIPS is 
the most comprehensive multilateral agreement on IP because it sets minimum 
standards for legal mechanisms, procedures, enforcement remedies and 
dispute settlements (WTO, 1995, Articles 1 & 41). 
 Accordingly, one part of our arguments emerges based on the need of 
integration toward international institutions for patent systems. First, 
international patent system development has a long history of convergence. 
Since 1883, member states (now 184 members for WIPO and 153 for the 
WTO) have been active toward international compliance. Most member states 
could have met the minimum requirements set out by WIPO and the WTO to 
institutionalize their patent system. Second, relevant treaties, conventions and 
agreements in WIPO and WTO have been the set standards for patent policy 
and actions. Take the patent law in China for example.  It was drafted on the 
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basis of the Paris Convention, Patent Treaty and revised according to TRIPS. 
Third, as a requirement of entry into the WTO, members must ratify a new 
entrant’s eligibility. This allows members to look at bilateral relationship and 
the consistency of policy stipulation in patent systems. On the basis of the 
above discussions, we expect that  
H1: Nations’ patent systems are likely to be integrated with the international 
patent system; that is, nations have met the minimum requirements stipulated 
by international organizations.  
2.3.2. Divergence in Patent System Development  
Functionalism of institutions emphasizes that despite the demand for 
integration in the international realm, states are the units of authority with 
distinctive national interests and transaction costs (Scholte, 2001). That is, 
these territory-based authorities have their own needs and wants for 
technology, trade, and cultural exchanges. This means that global integration 
among nations may receive national institution’s resistance when state interest 
and sovereignty are compromised.  
 National institutions are the key for international transformation because 
they are the adopters, adapters and implementers for global patent system 
integration. National institutions stress the importance of sovereigntism to 
allow nations to preserve their own independence. Thus, universal jurisdiction 
has its limitations (Weismann, 2010): no uniformity in nations codifying 
international rules and regulations; hard to enforce international laws; and 
nations are free to ratify or not ratify the treaties, conventions and agreements.  
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 Given the highly recognized country variations, international institutions 
are obliged to ensure global integration is functional, comprehensive enough 
to consider transaction costs and sovereign interests by setting minimum 
standards. To ensure functional global integration, nations focus on specific, 
sensitive areas of national interests, such as intellectual property. Therefore, 
global patent integration is the functional integration played by both national 
and international institutions. As a result, nations tend to have varied 
development in the process of implementing their patent system.  
 Sporadic research has recognized such development variations with four 
studies worth deliberation (Rapp & Rozek, 1990; Sherwood, 1997; Ginarte & 
Park, 1997; Ostergard, 2000). Rapp and Rozek (1990) measure the strength of 
patent laws in 159 countries on a zero-to-five scale (0 indicates ‘no patent 
laws’ and 5 ‘patent laws consistent with the minimum standard set out by the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce’). This study examines patent mechanism and 
compares patent system differences and the impact on economic development.  
It also recognizes the importance of enforcement without providing any 
measures. Empirically, though, this study has much wider geo-coverage to 
examine patent systems than any other research. 
 Sherwood (1997) studies 18 countries’ strength of IP systems, based on 
personal knowledge, experience and professional interviews using a score 
ranging between 0 and 103. The score takes account of enforcement, 
administration, laws, treaties and public commitment (U.S. State Department, 
1989-1995). It seems to be the only prior work recognizing the strength of IP 
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administration by testing the transparency (public awareness of decision 
making), efficiency (time scale to deal with IP issues) and costs of 
administration.  
 Sherwood’s findings (1997) show that patent mechanism is the highest in 
development, and administration the lowest. Sherwood also addresses the 
importance of enforcement by measuring judicial independence, ability to 
request court action and the rights to take civil actions. Like Rapp and Rozek 
(1990), however, Sherwood (1997) did not examine the performance of 
enforcement. Thus, it is unclear whether these enforcement measures will 
result in an efficient outcome of patent protection. Moreover, the separate 
strength of different IP laws cannot be identified, as they are all examined as a 
whole.   
 Ginarte and Park (1997) propose an index construction to study what 
determines patent rights using data of 110 countries from 1960 to 1990. The 
patent system in each country was measured using five variables - the extent 
of coverage, membership of international patent agreements, provisions for the 
loss of protection, enforcement mechanisms, and duration of protection 
(scaling 0-1 with one indicating the strongest protection). This research 
quantifies patent protection and identifies protection determinants by linking 
the patent indices with IB activities. It also assesses both patent mechanism 
and enforcement based on documentation. It appears to be the only 
longitudinal study to address patent system development. Finally, Ostergard 
(2000) argues that IP mechanism differs considerably from enforcement in 
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terms of development. Using trademark, copyright and patent data from 76 
countries, the study shows that 60 countries demonstrate higher scores in 
patent mechanism than in enforcement and significant gap between the two.  
      In summary, prior research all recognizes that patent mechanism is an 
essential part of the patent system, and is the most developed component of 
the three. The significance of administration and enforcement as part of the 
patent system is recognized, but understudied empirically. Relevant findings 
are varied and incomplete, and reinforcing the need for further testing and 
validation. Prior research also shows a high focus, recognition and 
development of patent mechanism, relatively slow development and high 
recognition in enforcement, and slow development and low recognition of the 
significant role of patent administration.  
  Linking these empirical studies with the element of functionalism 
discussed earlier, we observe the following consistency and contradictions. 
Functional international institutions are the exercise of nations to align their 
national patent rules and regulations with international treaties, conventions 
and agreements. Nations demonstrate their commitment based on state 
environment. One important part of the international institution is, thus, to 
manage and coordinate states and inter-states (patent administration), and 
resolve conflicts (dispute resolution and patent system enforcement). 
However, international institutions in the form of resolving conflicts ‘is 
historically the least frequent’ due to functional considerations (Ruggie, 1992, 
p. 567).  
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  Given the theory-empirics linkages, this present research would argue that 
international institutions as functional institutions emphasize process rather 
than implementation. The implementation of patent systems in line with 
international institutions lies in each individual state. Stipulating relevant rules 
and establishing administrative coordination become the priority for nations. 
In addition, while both patent administration and enforcement take time 
evolvement to be effective, enforcement probably takes longer time for 
experienced judges and lawyers to be in place. Although patent administration 
requires many experienced examiners, the process of filing and granting is 
more administrative and coordinating, rather than resolving, as in 
enforcement. 
   To sum up, the integration of institutions is conditional of preferences 
and capabilities within the national strategic environment (Caporaso, 1992). 
Nations pursue universal goals taking account of constraints to them (e.g., 
costs, interdependence, and economy). “[P]robably no two ‘systems’ are 
exactly alike”, and commonly “… they operate within the confines of a single 
nation” (Massel, 1973, p. 647). Thus, “TRIPS…is a minimum standard… 
which allows members to provide more extensive protection of IP if they so 
wish. Members are left free to determine the appropriate method of 
implementing the provisions of the Agreement within their own legal system 
and practice.” (WTO, 1995). In consequence, a lack of global consensus in 
both policy and actions is inevitable within and among nations. Thus, 
‘resolving issues’ (e.g., enforcing patent protection) becomes more intricate 
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than ‘coordinating matters’ among nations (e.g., procedural requirements of 
patent filing). On the above basis, we expect 
H2a: Nations are likely to be more developed in patent mechanism than in 
patent administration and enforcement. 
H2b: Nations are likely to be more developed in patent administration than in 
patent enforcement. 
3. METHODS 
3.1. Research Design  
This research adopts four exploratory techniques - secondary data analysis, 
experience survey, focus group and two-way design (Cooper & Schindler, 
2006) to ‘seek new insights; … to assess phenomena in a new light’ (Robson, 
2002, p. 59) and to clarify the suitability and feasibility of the study (Saunders, 
Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). Secondary data analysis leads to establishing a 
preliminary framework. In this process, we are able to review prior research 
and justify why we have examined global patent system development.  
The experience survey focuses on interviewing 13 WIPO and WTO 
directors and their representation of global patent perspectives is evidenced. 
The WIPO development division organized a seminar to examine patent 
system measurements in 2007. In this seminar opened by a deputy director 
general of WIPO, four experts in the field were invited and presented their 
work, including the first author, who presented the preliminary framework of 
measuring patent systems. The deputy director general in charge of the 
division subsequently had a meeting with the author to discuss the importance 
 19
of establishing a new framework and directed all regional directors to 
collaborate. These directors are specialist policy practitioners in the field. That 
is, they hold directorship in charge of IP policy and development in different 
regions across the world (i.e., North America, South America, South and 
Southeast Asia, West Europe, East Europe, Africa, and Middle East). 
Their representation is also shown in that all these UN experts have at 
least ten-year experience in IP policy and development. Our interviews with 
them allow us to find out their overall views on our study (three components 
and measurements). While they were confident that the measurements were 
objective; patent administration was a logical new factor; and the framework 
was concise, they also commented on improving relevant measures. 
Subsequently, the improved framework was presented to them again for 
further comments.  
 We have also used a focus group to further improve the framework. This 
focus group consists of six people from the IP audit division of WIPO, which 
conducts global scale IP audit. These auditors understand the need for a 
comprehensive but measurable IP framework. Thus, their input helped us 
further revise the patent system framework.   
 Finally, we have measured the research feasibility through a two-way 
design. One way includes conceptualization, operationalization and piloting 
with WIPO and WTO directors and a focus group; the other includes 
establishing the index and conducting statistical analysis to test whether and 
how the framework works.  
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3.2. Data Sources  
This study examined all 153 WTO members, but drew its conclusions based 
on the analysis of 88 countries that form 58% of the population. We excluded 
65 countries from the population due to non-available or incomplete dataset. 
Some members of developing and least developed countries are not obligated 
to implement the compliance of international standards until the end of their 
transitional years (e.g., 2016).  
Our indexing data are sourced from WIPO, the WTO and national patent 
offices. ‘Patent mechanism’ variables are indexed based on the patent laws 
and regulations of nations lodged in the ‘Collection of Laws’ on the WIPO 
website. ‘Patent administration’ data are indexed based on country information 
from WIPO, WTO and national patent offices (national offices were contacted 
only when information was unclear). ‘Patent enforcement’ data are drawn 
from the “Enforcement Checklist” compiled by the WTO, and member states 
are required to report their enforcement progress (Council for TRIPS, 1997). 
Where countries have not reported to the WTO, we examine relevant data 
based on their laws, annual reports and other available patent information.  
We should note the strengths and weaknesses of the patent data we have 
used. The WTO and WIPO organize data in a simple, systematic and unified 
manner. They are the main sources of data on the global trends of patent system 
development and the data are widely used by researchers and practitioners. 
These data are compiled based on national government reporting, and the ways 
of reporting data may vary across countries. For example, ‘availability of courts 
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to handle patent disputes’ can be interpreted in two ways: a special court may 
be available to deal with patent disputes, or the court may handle litigations. 
The former can be more efficient due to cases being handled in a concentrated 
manner, which also helps accumulate related experience. Such variations in the 
raw data make it difficult for WIPO and WTO to follow a strictly standardized 
approach to compiling and incorporating these data; thus possibly affecting our 
indexing scoring.  
3.3. Indexing and Measurements   
Table 1 details the conceptualization and operationalization for each variable. 
The variable selection for each component is based on prior research and 
practice of two international patent organizations - WIPO and the WTO. The 
index scores allow the patent system of each nation to be reflected in a range 
between 0 and 1 for consistency and comparison. ‘0’ indicates that a nation 
has made no effort to conform to an international patent standard specific to a 
measurement; ‘1’ indicates that a nation has fulfilled (and may even have 
surpassed) the minimum standard. We conducted a principal axis component 
analysis to test whether the measurements clustered toward each construct. 
<Table 1 > 
We have examined multi-collinearity between variables in three ways 
and concluded its existence can be tolerated within certain thresholds 
(Bowerman & O’Connell, 1990; Hair et al., 2009). Our results show the 
correlation coefficients are mostly below 0.70 with the largest value at 0.83 
(see detail in Table 2; within the threshold of 0.9), VIF smaller than 5.3 
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(smaller than the threshold 10) and tolerance greater than 0.19 (larger than the 
threshold 0.1). Methodologists argue that multi-collinearity is inevitable when 
dummy variables are used (Hair et al., 2009) and unavoidable in statistical 
analysis (Field, 2009). As a result, we retain all the variables and address the 
relations in our analysis.  
<Table 2> 
3.4. Analytical Methods  
We test our hypotheses using two statistical methods. We first conduct a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test to respond hypothesis one (question one): nations' 
patent systems have integrated with international patent systems. This 
analytical method allows us to identify the gaps between the actual and 
intended patent system. We, then, used an ANOVA test to address hypothesis 
two (addressing question two): to what extent patent system development 
diverges across the world.   
  
3.5. Reliability and Validity 
The reliability of this research is four-fold. First, a conceptual and operational 
framework was established to guide data collection and pilot study with WIPO 
experts. Second, we followed a protocol throughout the research process from 
research design, data collection procedures, data coding, analysis and 
interpretation. Third, we have documented the study database from the base 
materials (e.g., raw data and documents) to written materials (e.g., synthesis 
notes). Finally, reliability test yields Cronbach's alpha scores of 0.91, 0.71 and 
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0.72 (see Table 1), showing that our method measures what it intends to 
measure.  
 The study also demonstrates construct, internal and external validities. It 
uses multiple sources of evidence, including data sourced from WIPO, the 
WTO and national governments as well as from an experience survey and 
focus group interviews. A chain of evidence was established toward the 
construct validity, including database, citations, study protocol, face validity 
and operationalization with the findings validated by WIPO directors.   
4. RESULTS 
Table 3 reports the gaps between national and international institutions in 
terms of patent system development across the three components (i.e., actual 
and intended integration toward international standards). The non-parametric 
test allows us to compare the three pairs of means. If countries fully complied 
with the international patent standards, the scores across countries for different 
variables would be 1. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test, however, indicates all 
the comparative factors show significant differences (p<0.000) between 
intended and actual integration levels, and effect sizes for all the comparative 
factors show above the 0.05 levels.  
<Table 3> 
 The results of negative ranks show a large gap between international 
patent system and national patent systems, implying global patent integration 
has not taken place. Meanwhile, the effect size for the three components 
suggests that international efforts toward global patent integration have had 
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significant effect on member states. The development of patent mechanism 
shows an effect size at 0.92 followed by patent administration at 0.87 and 
patent enforcement at 0.85. The results indicate that the development is 
apparently visible among countries to introduce new patent laws and organize 
training for patent officials. To establish a new patent system, for example, 
countries have spent at least U.S.$1.5 million (Maskus, 2000) to guarantee that 
the patent office functions, human powers are available, and judicial system is 
in place for patent activities. 
  In summary, our findings refute H1. We conclude that nations’ patent 
systems are not integrated with the international patent systems. Nations have 
not met the minimum requirements stipulated by international organizations. 
However, international organizations’ effort on integrating nations is highly 
recognized in the process rather than in the outcome, and patent systems 
across the world remain nation-based.  
Table 4 shows the varied patent system development between the three 
components and across the countries. Post hoc testing indicates that all the 
constructs have different population means based on the 88-country sample 
analysis (i.e., the findings based on the sample represent those based on the 
population). In terms of the extent of development, it is apparent that patent 
mechanism is more advanced than the other two components and enforcement 
has made the slowest progress.  
<Table 4> 
The results support hypotheses 2a and 2b. As argued in H2a, nations are 
 25
more likely to be more developed in patent mechanism than in the other two 
areas of patent system; H2b: nations are likely to be more developed in patent 
administration than in patent enforcement. The results are in line with the 
finding relevant to H1 that international efforts toward global patent integration 
have had significant effect on member states. This is not only reflected in 
treaties, agreements and conventions becoming the ‘templates’ of legislation, 
but more importantly is evidenced in the active involvement of WIPO and the 
WTO in training human resources, and creating opportunities for nations to 
exchange views and experience. The results suggest strengthened patent 
administration across countries over the past years.  
 Different from patent administration, patent enforcement appears to be 
culture-bound. Each nation’s patent enforcement is embedded within its own 
legal system. It requires resources (particularly time and human power) to 
accumulate experience (e.g., antecedents, skilled lawyers and judges). Given 
most WTO members are developing countries, time factor to enforce patent 
systems plays an important role.  
  The relative frequency of the mean scores further demonstrates the 
varied development across the three areas of patent systems and across 
countries (Figure 2). The sample skews heavily toward the upper end of the 
scale for patent mechanism (0.91-1), indicating nearly 90% of the nations have 
mechanism compliance in place. For patent administration, the distribution 
spreads relatively evenly from 0.61 to 1, suggesting that nations have made 
efforts toward the development, though in a diverse manner. The distance 
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toward one another is relatively comparable, and further commitment is 
required from governments in this area. As for patent enforcement, the sample 
largely scatters between 0.51 and 0.7, indicating larger distance between 
international and national institutions. Such variations also demonstrate that 
most countries are moderate enforcers of patent rights, and have considerable 
room for improvement.  
< Figure 2> 
5. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1. Findings in Comparison to Prior Research 
This paper examines the integration and divergence of patent systems between 
national and international institutions with two questions addressed: (1) Have 
nations integrated their patent systems development under the influence of 
international institutions? (2) How are the three components of the patent 
systems compared and contrasted in terms of development across nations?    
 Based on the study of 88 members screened from the WTO membership, 
our findings show that the patent system is yet to be integrated across the 
world. It refutes hypothesis 1 and asserts that nations remain different in their 
own institutions. The result is in line with Massel (1973) that despite the 
efforts by national and international institutions over the past years, there has 
been no impact on the outcome of integration. Our evidence shows that 
international institutions have had strong influence on global integration, 
particularly in the development of patent mechanism (with effect size at 0.92, 
0.85 for enforcement, 0.87 for administration). The findings disconfirm prior 
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research (Bosworth, 1980; Ferrantino, 1993; Ginarte & Park, 1997; Sherwood, 
1997) that ratifying treaties, conventions and agreements represents nations’ 
integration with the rest of the world. This variable was insignificant in 
influencing integration at the factorial analysis stage. One possible 
explanation, in line with Deardorff (1992), is that countries are unlikely to 
have similar demands for patent protection due to their different expectations 
for invented goods. Different behaviors toward patent administration and 
enforcement yield different results. The other explanation is associated with 
TRIPS’ dominant role.  Over the past decade, it appears that TRIPS has 
become more important a gauging factor for patent integration than any other 
treaties, conventions, and agreements; thus rendering irrelevance the number 
of ratifications. This result allows us to confirm that international institutions 
have strong impact on the process of integration by nations.            
       Regarding question 2, our findings also show that the three components of 
patent systems do not advance in equal stance and there have been different 
degrees of development across countries resulting in our support for H2
a
 and 
H2b. Patent mechanism takes a center stage of development for most countries 
(90% of the countries examined have established TRIPS-based patent 
mechanism), indicating greater effort toward global integration than patent 
administration. The findings show that patent administration is diversely 
operational across countries, but still on average, more advanced development 
than enforcement (most countries are moderate enforcers). These findings 
corroborate prior research that countries’ patent mechanism tends to be the 
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most developed (Ostergard, 2000; Sherwood, 1997). Our results also confirm 
that nations are more developed in patent administration than in patent 
enforcement. This finding aligns with our logical argument and prior work by 
Ostergard (2000) that enforcement is difficult to implement and takes time to 
evolve due to the need for accumulating knowledge and experience.  
 The findings confirm prior research that enforcement is a factor to 
consider for improvement across nations, but taking prior research further, this 
study compares and contrasts these three components and identifies the degree 
of development. In particular, our findings clarify that the difference across 
countries in patent administration lies in nations’ way of operations. Patent 
enforcement does not form a significant cross-country divide due to most 
countries being moderate enforcers, but a wide gap of national-international 
institutions. This result contests Sherwood (1997) that patent administration is 
the weakest and the contradiction is probably due to Sherwood’s study having 
a small sample and different timeline of examination. Nowadays, countries are 
more active in establishing new patent administration, as evidenced by the 
increasing number of countries setting up patent offices.    
 
5.2. Managerial Relevance   
Our findings provide policy makers with implications for IB practice. They set 
a general direction of policy development for national and international patent 
organizations. Global comparison enables international organizations to 
examine in which areas (mechanism, administration or enforcement) 
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improvements should be so that they can effectively support countries to 
develop nation-based patent systems. National organizations can use the 
framework to examine their country’s performance in comparison to others, 
thus helping them set strategic patent policy targets. This pragmatic approach 
is proposed based on the reality that nations tend to use ‘model’ countries as 
inspirations (e.g., U.S. for China; South Africa for African countries).  
  This research has also provided managerial implications from IB 
perspectives. First, managers may assess the factors proposed in the 
framework between home and host countries to identify gaps of patent 
systems and formulate strategies of defense and prevention for patent 
protection in the host country environment. For instance, if a comparative 
analysis reveals that the host country has no criminal proceedings to deal with 
counterfeiting, it would send a signal to managers that penalty is not severe 
enough to eradicate counterfeiters. The manager will thus have to consider 
whether and how to allocate resources to protect patents at the corporate level 
and to collaborate with government organizations to safeguard corporate 
interests. Second, through a comparative analysis of home and host country 
patent systems, companies can link findings with corporate knowledge and 
experience to assess the feasibility of strategic options for cross-border patent 
activities. For example, by comparing the patent system at home and host 
countries, managers are able to detect how different the legislation is and how 
fast a patent can be granted. Accordingly, they are able to decide what 
resources they should allocate for patent granting, thus, controlling the timing 
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of patent commercialization. This is crucial given most commercialization 
takes place at around patent granting time (Gans, Hsu & Stern, 2007). Third, 
this framework will help managers identify the strengths and weaknesses of 
patent system development in a host country, thus leveraging costs and 
benefits of strategic options. That is, they will be able to, decide whether they 
should opt for arm’s length licensing or total control over the ownership to 
maximize patent value based on the assessment of the host country’s patent 
system environment.  
5.3. Contributions  
This study advances knowledge in two-fold by establishing a comprehensive 
framework to assess patent systems across countries. First, it enriches 
understanding toward the institutional theory from the perspective of a formal 
institution - patent systems. It confirms that the integral and influential nature 
of international institutions on national institutions is in the effort and process 
rather than the actual outcome of integration; and global integration is more an 
option and prospect rather than an obligation due to the nation-based nature of 
patent systems. As a consequence, nations may take proactive or reactive 
approaches to comply with international institutions based on their needs and 
interests. The study consolidates the foundations of institution-based view that 
nations’ formal institutions form constraints for global patent integration.  
 Second, it extends prior research to clarify the different degree of 
development across the three areas of patent system. This enriches the 
theoretical understanding of international institutions being functional in the 
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interests of nations. We are able to understand that patent mechanism is in 
place for member states. Patent administration across countries is 
operationally diverse and requires coordination. Patent enforcement across 
nations is consistently moderate, and there is large room for improvement.  
 Our empirical contribution is reflected in our effort to examine all the 
WTO members and use the WIPO and WTO international patent institutions 
to gauge nations’ patent system development. This appears to be the first 
effort to systematically use WIPO and WTO standards to measure patent 
systems, and thus aligns with the world trend toward global patent system 
‘benchmarking’. This contribution thus highlights the interconnected nature of 
national and international institutions and emphasizes the inadequacy of only 
considering national environments as institutions. Such contributions advance 
prior research that adopted the developed countries’ patent institutions to 
examine developing countries’ progress. While we should acknowledge the 
impact of major developed nations on the formation of international patent 
institutions, international patent institutions have become relevant with the 
intensive involvement of developing countries in recent years. Although our 
final sample only includes 88 members, we have examined the entire 
population of the WTO membership and only selected nations with complete 
datasets. The study, thus, is a starting point to examine the impact of 
international patent institutions on national institutions.   
 We make methodological contribution by proposing and exploring a 
comprehensive framework for global patent systems to aid our understanding 
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as to how international and national patent systems integrate and diverge. The 
introduction of the three-component examination of patent systems asserts the 
role of patent laws, but more importantly confirms the significance of 
enforcement and governmental administration of patents. Moreover, our 
framework allows decomposable patent system development measurements. 
This feature progresses prior research because it allows researchers and 
practitioners to focus on specific patent system development components 
according to their needs. For example, given China is constantly criticized for 
having weak enforcement, the Chinese government and interested researchers 
may examine the specific areas that can be improved to shake off the ‘weak 
enforcer’ image. Moreover, our sample includes some emerging economies 
(e.g., BRIC and Eastern Europe); thus enriching prior research setting and 
making these dynamic economies represented in the study.  
5.4. Limitations and Further Research  
This study has weaknesses to overcome through future research. First, further 
investigation is both feasible and necessary to confirm our integrated 
framework. With time, more members are obliged to conform to TRIPS, richer 
data will become available for further analysis. Second, there are gaps in 
statute and practice particularly for the enforcement component. Our indices 
were scored based on country enforcement reports, but it is unclear whether 
these reports entirely reflect actual practices. Future research can survey 
practitioners associated with patent system development and find out whether 
external survey scores correlate with our scores.  
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 Third, patent system development is nation-based, and countries continue 
to differ no matter how great their efforts are toward integration with 
international standards. This individuality means that nation-based cases need 
to be incorporated. For example, studies of countries like the UK, Germany, 
U.S, China, India and Brazil will provide readers with an understanding of the 
challenges and opportunities in a comparative manner. Finally, the changing 
nature of patent system development dictates the need for serializing data. 
With longitudinal data being accumulated, rich resources will be available to 
investigate the degree of integration and divergence, thus predicting 
development trends and enriching patent-related IB research and practice.  
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Table 1: Conceptualization and Operationalization – Patent Mechanism, Administration and Enforcement 
 
Component & Variable Conceptual Justification  Operational Delineation 
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0
.
9
1
)
 
=
 
0
.
9
1
)
 
1. Product &Process Inventions 
2. Novelty, Inventiveness & 
Utility 
Countries must protect product and process inventions in the law 
Three conditions for patentability set out by WIPO and the WTO 
Both inventions: 1; one missing: deduct 0.5; no protection: 0  
Full patentability: 1; one missing: deduct 0.333; no patentability: 0 
3. Rights Conferred for Product 
Patents 
4. Rights Conferred for Process 
Patents 
5. Rights Conferred for 
Transactions 
6. Patent Protection Duration  
Countries must stipulate exclusive rights to prevent third parties without owner consent from 
making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing patented product inventions 
Countries must stipulate exclusive rights to prevent third parties without owner consent from 
using, offering for sale, selling, or importing patented process inventions 
The owners should have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude 
licensing contracts 
Members should stipulate that the duration of patent protection is 20 years upon filing 
Complete stipulation: 1; one missing: deduct 0.20; no stipulation: 0 
 
Complete stipulation: 1; one missing: deduct 0.25; no stipulation: 0 
 
Complete stipulation: 1; One missing: deduct 0.333; no stipulation: 0 
 
20-year: 1; each missing year, reduce 0.05; no protection: 0 
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α
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0
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7. Transparency 
 
8. Frequency of Patent Law 
Revision 
9. Timescale to Grant Patents  
 
10. Patent Educational Institutions 
 
11. Non-Patent Stipulations 
 
12. Non-Infringement Stipulations 
13.  Compulsory Licensing 
Patent law in English and in native language is available online and this demonstrates equal 
treatment to foreign and local inventors  
Revisions of patent laws since 1995 demonstrate government efforts to improve patent 
mechanisms based on TRIPS standards  
The speed of granting shows government efficiency in disseminating knowledge, helps owners 
focus on inventive exploitation & minimize anxiety while the patent is pending;  
IP education reflects the IP awareness of the general public, or the potential to have such 
awareness; Both help intensify demand for IP protection 
Members are required to set exceptions and limitations in line with each nation’s tradition and 
interests.  This includes stipulations as to what is excluded for patenting grants 
Nations are required to stipulate what is considered non-infringement  
Nations should stipulate compulsory licensing to enforce non-voluntary technology transfer 
Full availability: 1; law in one language: 0.5; no law: 0 
 
 Revision takes place after 1995 (inc. 1995): 1; no revision: 0  
 
Timescale clearly indicated: 1; no stipulation: 0 
 
Education Institution Available: 1; Unavailable: 0  
 
Exceptions and limitations are stipulated: 1; only exceptions or 
limitations: 0.50; no stipulations: 0 
Non-infringements stipulations are listed: 1; Otherwise: 0 
Compulsory licensing provision stipulated: 1; No: 0 
E
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.
7
0
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=
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7
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14. Judicial Review of Patent 
Application  
Judicial review of patent applications (e.g., rejected application by the patent office) should be 
available  
If applicants are given rights to appeal judicially for their rejected 
patent application: 1; otherwise: 0.   
15. Civil Judicial Procedures & 
Remedies 
Court functions, evidence presentation, remedies for damage, compensation for wrong 
enjoinments, and costs and timeframe for implementation are available  
Complete functions: 1; one missing: deduct 0.2; no functions: 0 
16. Administrative Procedures & 
Remedies 
The administrative functions, evidence presentation, remedies for damage, compensation for 
wrong enjoinments and costs and timeframe for implementation are available 
Complete function:  1; one missing: deduct  0.2; no function: 0 
17. Provisional Judicial Measures  Authorize provisional judicial measures to prevent infringements and preserve their evidence, 
including the length of time and costs involved and indemnification of injuries 
Complete function:  1; one missing: deduct  0.2; no function: 0 
18. Provisional Administrative 
       Measures 
Authorize provisional administrative measures to prevent infringements and preserve evidence, 
including the length of time and costs involved and indemnification of injuries  
Complete function:  1; one missing: deduct  0.2; no function: 0 
19. Border Measures Allow owners to apply to Customs to suspend pirated product import with valid evidence  Yes: 1; No: 0. 
20. Criminal Procedure 
 
21. Court Available for Disputes 
Have jurisdiction over criminal offences, and criminal procedures and penalties for infringements 
Nations are required to report their court support for patent to the WTO and WIPO; Courts should 
be available to handle patent related disputes 
Complete criminal procedure: 1; one missing: deduct 0.3333; no 
function: 0  
Patent disputes resolution court available:  1; otherwise: 0 
 Notes: The above variables are selected based mainly on WIPO and WTO stipulations. The reliability of the measurements is justified on two counts. Firstly, the internal consistency shows that all 
variables lump together in a reliable manner toward the three main factors resulting in Cronbach’s Alpha ( α ) at 0.91, 0.71 and 0.70 respectively. Secondly, we have consulted experts within WIPO 
regarding the variable selection and relevance. This inter-rater approach allows us to finalize the framework based on their comments, and to have an assurance from them about the consistency of the 
framework. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Significance level at *P<0.05; **P<0.01; ***P<0.001  
 
 Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1. Product & Process Inventions 0.97 0.17 1.00                                     
2. Novelty, Inventiveness & Utility 0.95 0.18 .81*** 1.00                                   
3. Rights Conferred for Product 
Inventions 
0.93 0.23 .61*** .50*** 1.00                                 
4. Rights Conferred for Process 
Inventions 
0.92 0.26 .66*** .49*** .83*** 1.00                               
5.Rights Conferred for Transactions 0.93 0.20 .76*** .60*** .56*** .56*** 1.00                             
6.Patent Protection Duration 0.96 0.20 .67*** .59*** .56*** .72*** .58*** 1.00                           
7.Transparency 0.64 0.39 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.14 .24* .28** 1.00                         
8. Frequency of Revision 0.58 0.50 .22* 0.15 0.14 0.14 .24* 0.16 .42*** 1.00                       
9.Timescale to Grant Patents 0.82 0.37 .29** .27* .32** .39*** .49*** .40*** 0.18 0.06 1.00                     
10. Educational Institutions for IP 0.77 0.42 .23* .30** 0.14 0.09 .21* 0.15 .30** .30** 0.14 1.00                   
11. Non-patentable Stipulations 0.92 0.27 .51*** .49*** .40*** .36** .49*** .36** .26* 0.19 .31** .33** 1.00                 
12. Non-infringement Stipulations 0.78 0.40 .29** .32** .32** .39*** .31** .39*** .21* 0.16 .43*** 0.03 .21* 1.00                 
13. Compulsory Licensing Provisions 0.82 0.35 .40*** .54*** 0.16 0.18 .31** .22* 0.06 0.16 0.17 .32** .48*** .26* 1.00               
14. Judicial Review of Patent 
Application 
0.92 0.28 .45*** .46*** .31** .26* .31** .35** 0.12 .24* .30** .22* .36** 0.14 .32** 1.00             
15. Civil and Judicial Procedures & 
Remedies 
0.79 0.14 .54*** .57*** .34** .32** .44*** .46*** 0.19 0.07 0.15 .39*** .47*** .28** .28** .32** 1.00           
16. Administrative Procedures & 
Remedies 
0.28 0.44 0.03 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.14 -0.04 0.10 0.14 0.08 -0.05 0.02 0.20 0.18 1.00         
17. Provisional Judicial Measures 0.77 0.17 .31** .25* .21* 0.13 .25* 0.20 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.18 0.04 0.12 0.12 .40*** 0.14 1.00       
18. Provisional Administrative 
Measures 
0.19 0.36 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.01 0.15 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.06 .65*** 0.15 1.00     
19. Border Measures 0.53 0.28 .27* .22* .32** .33** .36** .25* .25* .22* .31** .21* .31** 0.19 0.03 .25* .32** 0.14 .37** .22* 1.00   
20. Criminal Procedure 0.74 0.22 .22* 0.18 .23* 0.19 0.13 0.18 0.05 -0.07 0.01 0.07 .32** 0.01 0.04 0.07 .41*** 0.15 0.20 0.15 .25* 1.00 
21. Court Available for Disputes 0.91 0.29 0.18 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.12 -0.03 -0.04 0.11 0.19 -0.03 -0.05 0.05 .27* 0.12 .29** 0.16 0.19 .38*** 
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Table 3: Degree of Global Patent Integration 
 
 
Comparing 
Factors Ranks Observation 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
Test 
Statistics(2) Effect Size
 
Patent 
Mechanism- 
Actual and 
Intended 
Negative 
Ranks 88
a 44.50 3916.00 
-8.583 (.000) -0.915 Positive Ranks 0
b
 .00 .00 
Ties 0c   
Total 88   
Patent 
Administration - 
Actual and 
Intended 
Negative 
Ranks 88
a 44.50 3916.00 
-8.157(.000) -0.870 Positive Ranks 0
b
 .00 .00 
Ties 0c   
Total 88   
Patent 
Enforcement - 
Actual and 
Intended 
Negative 
Ranks 88
a 44.50 3916.00 
-8.006 (.000) -0.852 Positive Ranks 0
b
 .00 .00 
Ties 0c   
Total 88   
 Notes:  
(1) a: Actual < Intended; b: Actual > Intended; c: Actual = Intended (full compliance with international standard); 
(2) The Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows the Z score based on positive ranks for each comparison and significance in 
bracket. 
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Table 4: Multiple Comparison Using ANOVA Randomized Block Design 
 
Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Sum of Squares DF 
Mean 
Square F P 
Model 171.216(1) 90 1.902 95.253 .000 
Constructs 4.024 2 2.012 100.746 .000 
Countries 5.638 87 .065 3.245 .000 
Error 3.475 174 .020   
Total 174.691 264    
Multiple Comparisons 
Factors(2) Mean Difference S.E. p 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 2 .182 .0213 .000 .130 .231 3 .302 .0213 .000 .250 .351 
2 1 -.182 .0213 .000 -.231 -.130 3 .120 .0213 .000 .070 .171 
3 1 -.302 .0213 .000 -.351 -.250 2 -.120 .0213 .000 -.171 -.070 
     Notes: 
(1) R2 = .980 (Adjusted R2 = .970) 
(2) 1 = Patent Mechanism (mean = 0.943); 2 = Patent Administration (mean = 0.761); 
3 = Patent Enforcement (mean = 0.641) 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Framework – Patent Systems within Institutions 
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